Rethinking Extraordinary Circumstances

Scott Dodson[*]

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Introduction

Normally, the entry of an unappealed final judgment ends the case forever, even if later developments undermine faith in the accuracy of the decision or the fairness of its procedural grounds.  Litigation must have an end, and a final judgment usually marks that point.

Rule 60(b), however, has long been available to provide relief from judgment to losing litigants where justice so demands.  The rule states that a court may relieve a party from final judgment "[o]n motion and just terms" under five enumerated grounds (including mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, voidness, and judgment satisfaction) and one catchall provision.[1]  The catchall, Rule 60(b)(6), provides that a court can relieve a party from judgment for "any other reason that justifies relief."[2]

Appreciating Mandatory Rules: A Reply to Critics

By Scott Dodson[*]

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It seems that few are pleased with the Court’s recent decision in Bowles v. Russell, in which the Court held the time limit for filing a notice of appeal to be jurisdictional and therefore not susceptible to the unique circumstances doctrine.[1]  As I wrote in my original Essay, I believe the Court disrupted prior precedent and missed a golden opportunity to develop, in a principled way, a framework for characterizing rules as jurisdictional or not[2] and I adhere to those views.

Three have responded to my Essay. Professor Perry Dane criticizes Bowles for failing to appreciate that jurisdictional rules—assuming the deadline to file a notice of appeal is in fact jurisdictional—need not lead inexorably to a rigid application.[3]  Mr. E. King Poor, Esq., defends Bowles as rightly decided and also as a good result.[4]  And, Professor Beth Burch criticizes Bowles for some of the same reasons I do, but she goes further to suggest that the Court (and I) failed to give sufficient recognition to the equity appeal of the case.[5]  It is appropriate for me to provide a brief reply to those who have joined me in this debate.

I.  A Reply to Professor Dane

I am sympathetic to Professor Dane’s argument that a jurisdictional rule need not necessarily be applied rigidly.[6]  I would go further, however, and explore—in a very preliminary way—three different strands that, while not necessarily entirely distinct from each other, capture different aspects of the role flexibility may play in jurisdictionality.

Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell

By Scott Dodson[*]

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On June 14, 2007, the Supreme Court decided Bowles v. Russell,[1] a case watched primarily by procedure geeks but one which may have enormous impact for courts and litigators.  It addressed a ubiquitous but confusing question of jurisdictional characterization:  when is a limitation “jurisdictional,” and when is it not?  Litigators encounter these questions all the time in statutory coverage issues, in time limitations, and in a host of other preconditions.  Whether a particular limitation is jurisdictional or not can be an important question, for jurisdictional limitations are not subject to waiver or equitable exceptions, may be raised at any time, and obligate courts to monitor and raise them sua sponte.  In Bowles, the Court held that the statutory time limitation for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.